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BOY SCOUTS MAY DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST HOMOSEXUALS ON THE
BASIS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA v. DALE
530 U.S. 640 (2000)
INTRODUCTION
After twelve years of otherwise “exemplary” service as a youth and
adult member of the Boy Scouts of America (“BSA”),1 James Dale’s
membership in the Monmouth Council Boy Scouts organization was
terminated in 1990 on the basis of his avowed homosexuality.2  Dale
challenged the dismissal claiming that the Boy Scout’s action violated
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) which prohibits
discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of
sexual orientation.3  Throughout the litigation, the Boy Scouts
asserted that allowing an avowed homosexual to retain his
membership in the Scouts violated their First Amendment right to
associate for expressive purposes.4  When Dale’s case reached the
state’s highest court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
BSA is a place of public accommodation under state law and their
dismissal of Dale on the basis of his sexual orientation violated that
law.5  Further they noted, that although the BSA does have a First
                                                          
1. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1204 (N.J. 1999) (describing James Dale’s
accomplishments as a boy scout and the Monmouth Council Boy Scout’s acceptance of his
application to serve as an adult scoutmaster at age eighteen in 1989), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
2. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 644.
3. Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1999).
4. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1230.
5. See id. at 1228 (holding that there is no evidence in the record to show that one of the
1
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Amendment right to expressive association, admitting Dale did not
violate that right.6  By a narrow vote of 5-4, the United States Supreme
Court took the opposite view, finding that New Jersey’s LAD is
contrary to the Boy Scouts’ right to expressive association.7  Since the
decision was released in June 2000, BSA has received criticism for
their policy, including legislation in Congress to revoke their federal
charter.8
FACTS
James Dale first joined the Boy Scouts in 1978 at the age of eight,
serving as a cub scout for three years.9  He then became a boy scout in
1981, serving in three different troops over a seven-year period until
he reached age eighteen in 1988.10  Throughout this period, Dale
received numerous merit badges, served in leadership positions, was
admitted to special scout orders, and received among the highest
honors that the Boy Scouts confer—the Eagle Scout Badge.11  Shortly
after ending his membership as a youth in the Scouts, Dale applied
and was accepted for adult membership, and was appointed to the
position of assistant scoutmaster of Troop 72 of the Monmouth
Council scouting organization, a local New Jersey division of BSA.12  It
was during his sixteen months of service as an adult scoutmaster that
Dale acknowledged his homosexuality to family and friends and
became involved in a gay and lesbian student organization at Rutgers
University where he had enrolled as an undergraduate.13  Dale’s
sexual orientation became public when an article published in a New
                                                          
purposes of the BSA is to promote the view that homosexuality is immoral).
6. See id. at 1225 (indicating that there appeared to be no single views espoused by the
Boy Scouts on the morality of homosexuality that served the purpose of providing “a unifying
associational goal of the organization”).  The Supreme Court of New Jersey therefore held that
because the Boy Scouts do not associate for the expressive purpose of decrying homosexuality
as immoral, “Dale’s expulsion constituted discrimination based solely on his status as an openly
gay man.”  Id.
7. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 659 (referring to New Jersey’s Law Against
Discrimination as a “severe intrusion” on the Boy Scouts right of expressive association).
8. See 146 CONG. REC. 7448-55 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (detailing various legislative
attempts to revoke the BSA charter and discussing some of the criticism Congress has made
regarding the BSA policy).
9. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1202 (discussing Dale’s fourteen years as a member of the Boy
Scouts).
10. See id. at 1204.
11. See id. (describing the honor of receiving the Eagle Scout Badge as one that only three
percent of all scouts receive).
12. See id.
13. See id. (noting that Dale eventually became president of the Rutgers University
Lesbian/Gay Alliance).
2
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Jersey newspaper discussing a seminar on gay and lesbian teenage
health issues pictured Dale and identified him as the co-president of
the gay-lesbian student organization at Rutgers.14
Dale’s membership in BSA came to an end soon thereafter
presumably when leaders in the Monmouth Council saw the
newspaper article identifying Dale as a homosexual.15  Dale was
informed by letter from an executive of the Monmouth Council
organization, which had admitted him, merely that his membership
in BSA had been terminated.16  Dale wrote back to the organization
requesting an explanation for his termination.17  He was informed in
a subsequent letter that his membership had been severed because
Boy Scouts standards prohibit membership to homosexuals.18  Dale
subsequently pursued review of the Council’s decision through the
BSA regional and national organizations, and because he was not
reinstated, he filed suit against BSA in 1992.19  Dale’s suit argued that
his dismissal by BSA was a violation of the Law Against
Discrimination, a New Jersey statute, which prohibits discrimination
in places of public accommodation on the basis of sexual
orientation.20
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At the trial court level or chancery division, the court held that
LAD did not apply to the Boy Scouts because BSA was not deemed to
                                                          
14. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205 (stating that Dale was merely in attendance at the seminar on
psychological and health needs of homosexual teenagers and not attending in his capacity as
co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance).  As described by the Supreme
Court, the Star Ledger, the local New Jersey newspaper, while covering the seminar on the
psychological and health needs of gay and lesbian youth, interviewed Dale “about his advocacy
of homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role models.”  Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 645.
15. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1205 (timing the delivery of the letter to Dale severing his
membership in BSA to the same month—July 1990—that Dale’s picture appeared in the Star
Ledger newspaper).
16. See id. (quoting from the letter to Dale from Monmouth Council Executive James W.
Kay which granted Dale sixty days to request a review of the termination of his membership by a
regional BSA review committee).
17. See id.
18. See id. (attributing the standard of the BSA’s views on BSA’s rejection of homosexuals
from service in the organization to the leadership of the national BSA).
19. See id. (indicating that Dale also requested a copy of the BSA standards for leadership
from the regional BSA organization but was never provided such information).
20. See id. (stating that Dale pursued the lawsuit because he believed the review of the
national BSA would prove to be futile).  See generally Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 1999) (prohibiting discrimination against persons by reason of race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, affectional or sexual orientation, marital status, liability
for service in the Armed Forces, or nationality).  This law not only applies directly to
individuals, but also to a person’s spouse, partner, member, employee, and various other
persons related to an individual.  Id.
3
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be a place of public accommodation and that, even if it were a place
of public accommodation, it would meet the exception to the law for
“distinctly private” activities.21  Further it held that the Boy Scouts’
right to associate for expressive purposes as guaranteed by the First
Amendment was violated due to BSA’s policy against homosexuality.22
On appeal, the lower court decision was reversed.23  The appellate
court held that BSA is a place of public accommodation and
revocation of Dale’s membership violated New Jersey’s LAD.24  The
court also held that BSA’s right to associate for expressive purposes
was not violated because “BSA’s collective ‘expressive purpose’ is not
to condemn homosexuality,” and that Dale’s membership “will not
affect in ‘any significant way’” the views and activities pursued by
BSA.25
BSA appealed the decision to the state’s highest court, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. 26  Like the appellate court, the state
supreme court found that BSA is a place of public accommodation
and that Dale’s dismissal by BSA violated New Jersey’s LAD.27  As to
BSA’s claim that its First Amendment right of expressive association is
violated by LAD, the court dismissed such claim because “the statute
does not have a significant impact on Boy Scout members’ ability to
associate with one another in pursuit of shared views.”28  Specifically,
the court found that boy scouts do not associate to disseminate the
belief that homosexuality is immoral, BSA discourages its leaders
from providing scouts information on sexual issues, and that
members and sponsors of BSA have different views on
homosexuality.29  The BSA petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
                                                          
21. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1204 (rejecting, in addition, Dale’s common law claim that state
policy opposes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
22. See id. at 582 (concluding further that Dale was an active homosexual and that
homosexual acts are immoral).
23. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (affirming the
lower court’s holding against Dale’s common law claim against BSA, but reversing on the claim
that BSA violated New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination).
24. See id. at 280-81 (relying on BSA’s open membership and its advertising and public
promotion to conclude that the Boy Scouts come under the law’s definition of a place of
“public accommodation”).
25. Id. at 288.
26. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
27. See id. at 1213 (identifying numerous activities, its membership structure, and other
features of the Boy Scouts to support the holding that BSA is a place of public accommodation
under the New Jersey statute).
28. Id. at 1223.
29. See id. (agreeing with BSA that it expresses belief in moral values and encourages the
moral development of its members, but denying that BSA members associate to promote the
view that homosexuality is immoral).
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certiorari on the belief that New Jersey’s LAD does violate BSA’s First
Amendment right of association for expressive purposes; the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in early 2000.30  The case was
argued on April 26, 2000 and a decision issued on June 28, 2000.31
SUPREME COURT’S HOLDING
BSA’s Expressive Association Disapproves of Homosexuality
The five-member majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
and held that LAD violates BSA’s First Amendment right to
expressive association.32  The Court’s holding is premised on the view
that BSA has a right to associate for expressive purposes and that
such expression disapproves of homosexual behavior and of
homosexuals serving as members.33
Activities protected by the First Amendment, the Court’s analysis
begins, includes the right to association as set forth by the Court in
Roberts v. United States Jaycees.34  As described by the Court, the holding
in Roberts provided that government actions that may
unconstitutionally burden the freedom of association “may take many
forms, one of which is ‘intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association.’”35  In addition, the Court notes that the right to
expressive association, as set forth in New York State Club Association,
Inc. v. City of New York,36 protects against the forced inclusion of an
unwanted person as part of a group; forced inclusion is considered
an infringement upon the group’s right to expressive association if
the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.37  However, the
Supreme Court notes that such freedom is not absolute and, as
articulated by the Court in Roberts, freedom of expressive association
can be overridden by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
                                                          
30. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 528 U.S. 1109 (2000).
31. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
32. See id.
33. See id. at 655 (contending that associations do not have to associate for the purpose of
disseminating a specific message in order to receive protection under the First Amendment, but
rather, their expressive association is protected so long as they engage in an expressive activity
that could be impaired if such protection is not guaranteed).
34. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
35. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (quoting Robert. 468 U.S. at 623).
36. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
37. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (citing New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1998)).
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interests that are unrelated to the suppression of ideas of the
association if the state’s interests cannot be achieved through means
that are less restrictive.38
Turning to the issue of whether the Boy Scouts have a right to
associate for expressive purposes, the Court reviewed the mission
statement, oath, and law of the Boy Scouts and concluded that BSA
does engage in expressive association.39  For example, the Court
notes, the mission statement of BSA is to instill values in young
people, and a Scout vows to keep one’s self “physically strong,
mentally awake, and morally straight.”40  On the basis of these
expressions and others, the Court concludes, “[i]t seems indisputable
that an association that seeks to transmit such a system of values
engages in expressive association.”41
Although neither the mission, oath, or law of the Boy Scouts
expressly mentions views on homosexuality or sexual orientation, the
majority opinion states that BSA has asserted that homosexual
conduct is not consistent with the oath’s pledge to be morally
straight.42  This assertion by BSA, the Court contends, along with
position statements issued by BSA’s Executive Committee in 1978,
and two later position statements issued after Dale’s membership was
revoked, are instructive as to BSA’s policy on homosexuality.  Also
relying on the views of the Boy Scouts as expressed in previous cases,43
the majority opinion concludes,  “[w]e cannot doubt that the Boy
Scouts sincerely hold [the] view,” that homosexuality is not consistent
with the Scout’s mission, oath, or law, and that BSA teaches that
homosexual conduct is not “morally straight.”44  The Court expressly
rejects the holding of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the
exclusion of Boy Scout members on the basis of sexual orientation is
inconsistent with BSA’s commitment to diversity and representative
                                                          
38. See id. (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
39. See id. at 650 (holding that the oath, mission and activities of the Boy Scouts indicate
that the Scouts engage in expressive association).
40. See id. at 649 (citing the Boy Scouts’ mission, oath, and law).
41. Id.  The minority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, vehemently argues against the
existence of any policy held by the BSA, prior to the Dale’s suit, on its disapproval of
homosexuality.  See id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  “BSA fails to show that it ever taught
Scouts that homosexuality is not ‘morally straight’ or ‘clean,’ or that such a view was part of the
group’s collective efforts to foster a belief.”  Id.
42. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 651.
43. See id. (citing Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., No. C- 365529
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 25, 1991)).
44. See id. (holding that the “official position of the Boy Scouts was that avowed
homosexuals were not to be Scout leaders” dates to a 1978 position statement signed by two
BSA leaders).
6
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membership.45  “[I]t is not the role of the courts,” according to the
Court, “to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree
with them or find them internally inconsistent.”46
The majority suggests that just as the Court must give deference to
the nature of BSA’s expression, so too must it defer to BSA’s position
on the inclusion of Dale in the organization would significantly affect
Boy Scouts’ right to expressive association.47  Rather than “erect a
shield against antidiscrimination laws” by BSA’s assertions, the Court
holds that BSA’s genuine desire not to promote homosexual conduct
as a legitimate form of behavior would be significantly burdened by
Dale’s presence as an assistant scoutmaster.48  Contrary to BSA’s First
Amendment protection of expressive association, Dale’s presence in
the Scouts would “force the organization to send a message, both to
young members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.”49
The Supreme Court disagrees with the holding of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey that the Boy Scouts’ ability to disseminate its
message would not be significantly affected by the forced inclusion of
Dale.50  This is so, the Court notes, for the following reasons: (1)
associations do not have to associate for the purpose of disseminating
a certain message in order to be entitled to protection, but must
merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired; (2) the
First Amendment protects BSA’s method of expression; and (3) not
every member of a group must agree for the group’s policy to be
considered association for expressive purposes.51  As concluded
                                                          
45. See id. at 651 (analyzing the BSA’s views in the context of “reach[ing] ‘all eligible
youth’”).
46. See id. at 651 (stating that precedent rejects the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey that the views of a group may be rejected because the court believes they are unwise
or irrational).
47. See id. at 651.  In dissent, Justice Stevens takes issue with the majority’s reliance on
BSA’s assertions that its expressions provide evidence of opposition to homosexuality because,
in his view, the record in this case does not.  Id. at 2470.  Justice Stevens writes, “I am unaware of
any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was
determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further.”  Id.
at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 653 (suggesting that Dale’s status as co-president of the
Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance and his posture as a “gay rights activist” would, if he
remained in the Boy Scouts, send a message that is inconsistent with BSA’s views).
49. Id.  The Court holds that even though BSA does not have to “trumpet its views from the
housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks,” it is still entitled to protection under the
First Amendment.  See id. (discarding Dale’s assertion that the Boy Scouts do not revoke
memberships of heterosexuals with contrary views to those of BSA on the grounds that Dale
expresses more than contrary views as an avowed gay man and gay rights activist).
50. Id. at 653.
51. See id. at 654-55 (adding that even though BSA directs scoutmasters to avoid discussion
of sexuality with scouts that make inquiries, BSA’s expression should be protected regardless of
7
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succinctly in the majority opinion, “[t]he Boy Scouts has a First
Amendment Right to choose to send one message but not another.”52
LAD Violates BSA’s First Amendment Right
Having concluded that BSA does not have a right of expressive
association with regard to homosexuality and that the inclusion of
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster is contrary to that expression, the
majority opinion examined whether the New Jersey LAD, protecting
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation, violates BSA’s First Amendment right.  The
Court concluded the New Jersey LAD violated BSA’s rights and that
to require BSA to accept Dale is indeed contrary to their First
Amendment freedom of expressive association.53
The Court rebuked the lower court’s inclusion of a private
organization such as BSA in the definition of a place of public
accommodation, stating that the broadness of such a definition has
increased the “conflict between state public accommodation laws and
the First Amendment rights of organization.”54  The Court
differentiated its previous holdings in Roberts55 and Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte56 from its holding in this
case, claiming that in these cases, the state had a compelling interest
in ending discrimination against women in places of public
accommodation.  By contrast, in this case, enforcement of a state
antidiscrimination does “materially interfere” with BSA’s views.57  On
the basis of “severe intrusion,” the Court held, “[t]he state interests
embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify
such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights of freedom of
                                                          
this policy).
52. Id. at 656.
53. See id. at 655 (claiming that the Supreme Court of New Jersey erred in considering BSA
to be a place of public accommodation rather than a private organization).
54. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657 (2000) (arguing that no attempt was
made by the Supreme Court of New Jersey to relate the term “place” to a physical location when
it included BSA such a place of public accommodation).
55. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
56. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
57. See Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 659 (suggesting that New Jersey’s Law Against
Discrimination, unlike the state laws invoked in previous cases, “directly and immediately”
affects associational rights).  The Court proceeds to hold that the analysis to reach its
conclusion in Dale is similar to that its used in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995).  See id.  In Hurley, the Court held that the extending a
Massachusetts public accommodation law to enable a gay and lesbian organization to
participate in a parade did violate the First Amendment right of parade organizers.  Hurley, 515
U.S. at 572.  The holding of the Court in Hurley rested on the notion that the “choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view . . . is presumed to lie beyond the
government’s power to control.”  Id. at 574-75.
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expressive association.”58
Concluding the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected
as a basis for its holding an intolerance of homosexuality in the face
of greater social acceptance—a view suggested by the minority.59  The
majority opinion argued that the Court is not guided in its opinion by
its own views of the correctness of BSA’s teachings on homosexuality
but, rather, on the First Amendment free speech rights of BSA.60
AFTERMATH
On the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision and the Boy Scouts’
policy regarding homosexuality, the Boy Scouts have faced
opposition from other public and private organizations that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.61  For example, the
City of Chicago has prohibited the Boy Scouts from using public city
parks, schools or other public sites; the United Way of Fall River,
Massachusetts has voted to withdraw its support for the Boy Scouts;
and corporations such as Textron and Knight Ridder have
terminated their support of the Boy Scouts.62  Further, legislation was
introduced in the U.S. Congress to revoke the federal charter of the
Boy Scouts.63  Debated unexpectedly in the House of Representatives
on September 12, 2000, the federal legislation to revoke the Boy
Scouts charter was defeated by a vote of 12-362.64  Although there was
                                                          
58. Id. at 2457.
59. See id. at 2458.  Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion argues that the only “apparent
explanation” for the majority’s view that Dale’s homosexuality infringed on BSA’s right of
expressive association was that “homosexuals are simply so different from the rest of society that
their presence alone—unlike any other individual’s—should be singled out for special First
Amendment treatment.”  Id. at 2476 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 2458.
61. See 146 CONG. REC. 7450 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000) (statement of Rep. Woolsey)
(describing actions by public and private organizations condemning the Boy Scout policy of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).  Rep. Lynn Woolsey argued that opposition
to the Boy Scouts’ position on homosexuality was not a “fringe movement,” but rather “part of a
mainstream belief that intolerance in any form is un-American.”  Id.
62. See id. (identifying an organization, known as Scouting for All, formed by a twelve-year-
old scout from Petaluma, California, which opposes the BSA policy and has secured more than
53,000 signatures to support a change in the policy).
63. See Scouting for All Act, H.R. 4892, 106th Cong. (2000).
64. See 146 CONG. REC. H7521 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2000) (recording fifty-one members of
the House voting “present” because the legislation had not moved through the House in the
customary manner).  Because H.R. 4892 was brought up on the House floor by Republican Asa
Hutchinson (Arkansas)—an opponent of the bill—with the apparent intent to embarrass
supporters, namely House Democrats.  See 146 CONG. REC. H7448 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000)
(statement of Rep. Hutchinson).  One commentary on the House vote argued that private
organizations receiving public support should not be entitled to engage in discrimination.
Sexual Disorientation, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 25, 2000 at 12.  “The Boy Scouts can be private bigots
or public citizens—but not both at once.”  Id.
9
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strong sentiment expressed by legislators on the House floor as to the
importance of the Boy Scouts to America society, Rep. Lynn Woolsey,
author of the legislation, said she merely intended to send “a clear
message that the civil rights movement is alive and well in the United
States of America, and that this Congress does not support
discrimination in any form.”65
The repercussions of this decision will continue to resound as
debate endures in communities, public and private organizations, the
halls of legislatures, and perhaps, in court sometime again.  And if
Justice Stevens is right, in stating that social acceptance of
homosexuality is increasing, perhaps debate will also resume within
the local organizations and hierarchy of BSA.
DENNIS AMARI
                                                          
65. 146 CONG. REC. H7450 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2000).
10
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